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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
TROY 0. NANCE, and
TI-IO~IAS B. HANLEY,
Plaintiffs and Respondents
and Cross-Appellants,
Case
No. 9111

vs.
SHEET l\IETAL WORKERS
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION,
an unincorporated association,
Defendant and AppeZZ:ant.

Reply and Answer Brief
For Defendant and Appellant
REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' STATEMENT OF FACTS
It is needless to point out each precise area of disagreement between the parties with respect to the facts. We do
not agree entirely ·with plaintiffs' statement of facts and
will point out briefly some of the new matter that is inaccurately stated in their recitation.

I.

At page 2 of plaintiffs' brief, they state that the first
phase of the case (tried to the court sitting without a jury)
1
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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"related to the legality of the expulsion, the right to recover exenLplary damages and attorneys fees.'' With respect to the right to recover exemplary damages and attorneys fees, the record shows the following significant
stipulation of counsel with the court (Pre-T., 9-5-58, 1) :
''THE COURT: The record will show as to No.
3783, set for trial October 6, 1958, that the trial will be
proceeded with without empaneling a jury, on the matter of whether the expulsion of the petitioner and the
intervenor was or was not wrongful, and that will be
decided by the court without a jury; that if the court
finds that the expulsion was wrongful in either case,
then the case would be consolidated with No. 3784 upon
the question of the petitioner's or the intervenor's
damages and the jury would be called upon to render
a verdict upon the issue of the amount of damages.
'' }.IR. FISHER: It will also be understood that
the trial in 3784 in any event will commence immediately after the trial in 3783?
"THE COURT: The court proposes to set the
trial of case 3784 to follow in1mediately upon completion of the trial of 3783 before the court upon the issue
of the expulsion of the petitioner and the inte1Tenor.
and the record may show that counsel on each side
consent to that method of procedure.
"l\IR. _l\rcCUNE:

\Ye so stipulate.

"1\fR. SANDACK:

\Y e would so stipulate.'·

The entire first phase of this case
accordance with this stipulation.

wa~

tried precisely in

It was not until the first phase of the case had been
concluded and the court had announced its decision finding
the expulsions were void that the court, in its Order of Jan2
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uary 21, 1959, unilaterally set aside this stipulation and decided that not all of the damage issues would be thrown to
the jury. This action by the court was in derogation of
the stipulation and was done over vigorous protest on the
part of counsel for the union as earlier discussed in our
opening brief.
1'Ioreover, it is erroneous to state that, "* * * the court
postponed decision [on December 30, 1958, or January 9,
1959] on the issues whether the defendant had acted wrongfully and maliciously and whether, as a consequence thereof, plaintiffs were entitled to recover punitive and exemplary damag·es and attorneys fees pending the trial of the
issues to be tried before the jury.'' Reference to plaintiffs' appendix, pages 9 through 12, shows that the court.
at those times, made absolutely no reservation of any damage issues to be decided by the court alone. The court had
no intention of adjudicating any damage issues (whether
compensatory, nominal or punitive) until its sudden change
of position announced January 21, 1959, in its ''Order as
to Issues to be Submitted to Jury."

II.
Plaintiffs' comments at pages 6 and 7 of their brief,
imputing to defendant sole responsibility for the length
of trial, appear to be uncalled for. The prolixity of the trial
both before the court and before the jury was certainly not
the result of any plan on the part of counsel for the union.
The damage claims alone approximated nearly one-half
million dollars. The alleged activities covered the years
1954 up to the time of trial in 1958 and involved conduct
alleged to have taken place inN evada, Arizona, California,
3
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Utah, Montreal, Canada, Washington, D. C. and Miami,
Florida. The trial court permitted plaintiffs and their
witnesses to testify extensively as to hearsay reports and
conversations, and defendant had the burden to bring int?
court the essential proof and witnesses to refute the evidence attributed to them.

III.
Under the heading, ''FACTS PRECEDING UNIOX
CHARGES", pages 10 through 19, plaintiffs' brief, is a
resume of the testimony most favorable to plaintiffs directed to the issue that union president Byron and other general officers engaged in a conspiracy to oust and suppress
Hanley and Nance of union membership on account of their
advocacy of political resolutions. It should be noted that
all of this testimony is refuted by witnesses who appeared
for the union (see pages 46 and 47 of our opening brief),
but we think the short answer, rather than detail such testimony and burden this brief, is that the trial court did not
credit plaintiffs' testimony on this conspiracy theory.
The defendant previously has conceded that the trial
court found that, in preferring charges against Hanley and
Nance, President Byron was motivated in part at least by
a wrongful desire to prevent them from promoting these
resolutions; but the court further found that Byron also
had received reports and information pertaining to aetiYities of Hanley and Nance which, if assumed to be true,
would have given him probable cause to believe that the
charges which he preferred, or at least some of them, were
true. (See plaintiffs' appendix, page 23, parag-raph 12.)
This does not constitute a finding that the charges were
4
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illegal because they were preferred maliciously; nor was
it a finding that President Byron acted improperly in preferring them.
\Ve point out further that plaintiffs' insinuations at
page 21 of their brief that Grant Stetter, the private investigator employed by the union, conducted a biased investigation of Hanley and Nance is not substantiated by any
finding of the trial court.
Likewise, there is no finding by the trial court that
Vice President Fitzgerald, who was a member of the union
trial board, or any other member of the union trial board,
was hostile to or biased against plaintiffs (See p. 28, plaintiffs' brief). In fact, as was shown in our opening brief,
the trial court's decision that plaintiffs' trials were void
was based almost entirely on the premise that their trials
should not have proceeded in absentia. That premise
would have been wholly untenable if the court believed that
the trial board would not have given them an impartial
trial.
Finally, the trial court made no finding that any member of the union's Grievance and Appeals Committee at the
~Iontreal Convention was hostile to or biased against Hanley and Nance or that any of such members were importuned by President Byron, any other general officer, or any
other person, to deal prejudicially with the appeals of
Hanley or Nance.

REPLY TO POINT IA OF PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF
Two statements made in plaintiffs' argument under
Point IA fairly bring the crucial issue of this lawsuit into

5
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focus. At page 52, they state, ''The responsibility for
conducting orderly trials rested on the defendant and on
the defendant alone", and at pag·e 55, "* * * their [Hanley's and Nance's] conduct was neither improper nor censurable under the circumstances.''
In our opening brief, we pointed out that a labor union
trial, as distinguished from a trial in a court of law, depends almost entirely upon the willingness of the union
member to submit himself in good faith before the trial
board to stand trial in accordance with the rules of procedure of that board. Without this willingness to comply, it
would be absolutely impossible to conduct an orderly trial
or hearing. A union trial board cannot compel compliance
with its procedure by force. Thus, plaintiffs' statement
that the responsibility for conducting orderly trials rests
on the union is not only meaningless but undoubtedly false
if by it they mean to say that the union has the sole duty to
n1aintain order and, in fact, must maintain it despite an~
thing that might happen at the trials. Such an impossible
burden can not be cast upon the Union. All of the duty is
not placed on the union; the persons accused also have an
equally significant duty to conduct themselves properly at
these trials and to refrain from disorder, disobedience, or
contumacity.
The ''open hearings'' on June 3, 4 and I were indeed
a "shmn and farce", but the~~ became so on account of the
inexcusable misconduct of :Messrs. Hanley and X ance and
their cohorts, who contended that the~~ were willing to stand
trial and ~Tet, h~T their conduct and design, refused to submit
even to the preliminary orders for holding the trial and
who thus prevented the trials fron1 e\·er commencing.

6
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The initial procedural rules of the union trial board,
namely: Exclusion from the trial room of witnesses, spectators and newspaper reporters during the course of proceedings, were manifestly not unreasonable. The separation of witnesse~ rule has long been honored in the
courts. There is no authority of which we are aware that
requires private union trials to be open to the public. It
was not the duty of the trial board to conduct trials under
terms demanded by Hanley and Nance; rather, it was the
duty of Hanley and Nance to comply with the trial board's
rules of procedure, unless the same could be said to be so
unreasonable that insistence upon them would be equivalent to a denial of due process.
But nothing we say here could convincingly demon~trate the merit of our position as well as a careful reading
of the complete verbatim transcripts of the open hearings,
contained in the appendix to our opening brief. These
transcripts supply the answer to the crucial question of this
lawsuit: Whether Hanley and Nance wrongfully refused to
stand trial, or whether they were improperly denied a trial.

REPLY TO POINT II OF PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court found that
their expulsions were also independently illegal on the
ground that the proceedings were malicious. We understand this contention to mean that even if the trial court
had held that the expulsion proceedings were not violative
of due process of law, the court nevertheless would have
held the expulsions to be null and void on account of malicious motives harbored by a few of defendant union's officials. There is no support for this proposition in any of
7
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the memoranda issued by the trial court or in its Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and final Judgment. It is
clear, as we pointed out in our opening brief, that the only
ground upon which the expulsions were ruled invalid was
denial of due process. The findings of the court pertaining to malice are directed exclusively to the proposition
that if it can be shown that illegal proceedings are also
tainted with malice, a right to recover exemplary damages
therefor may lie.
We attempted, moreover, in our opening brief, to demonstrate that Judge Hoyt erred in finding that the expulsions were even partially motivated by malice. We further
pointed out that the inference that President Byron was
motivated by a proper objective in preferring the charges
against the plaintiffs is distinctly stronger than the inference that he was maliciously motivated. In this connection,
counsel for plaintiffs properly point out in their brief
that the case of N.L.R.B. v. Huber & Huber }fotor Exp.,
223 F. 2d 748 (C.A. '5th 1955), which was cited at page 47
of our opening brief, was overruled in the subsequent decision of N.L.R.B. v. Fox Manufactu,ring Co .. 238 F. 2d 211
( C.A. 5th 1956). It is fair to state, however, that the Fifth
Circuit overruled this case only because of the requirement
of the National Labor Relations Act that, upon review, a
decision of the National Labor Relations Board must be
sustained if there is substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole to support the findings of that Board.
Thus, the rule to be applied there was the one imposed by
federal statute rather than the rule of the Con1mon Law.
This does not detract in any measure from the general
proposition that when different inferences may be drawn
from the same set of circumstances, it is the dutv of the
trial court to presume in favor of innocent condu~t rather
8
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than in favor of intentional and guilty misconduct.
,','tate v. J/usser, Utah, 175 P. 2d 724, Syllabus 25.

See

REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' POINT III
At page 62 of the plaintiffs' brief, they state as a general proposition that an award of punitive damages may
be made by the judge where the factual issues are tried by
him. Neither the weight of authorities nor those cited by
plaintiffs support this proposition. The plaintiffs have
really cited authorities for the limited proposition that in
an action at law for money damages only when the parties
expressly waive their rights to trial by jury a court may
make any damage awards the jury might have made. This
is wholly inapposite to the present case where Nance sued
for a write of mandamus and Hanley sued for a mandatory
injunction, and both sought damages as relief incidental to
the primary prayer for reinstatement to membership in the
uniOn.
Thus, Calvat v. Franklin, 990 Colo. 444, 9 P. 2d 1061,
inYolves an action at law in which both parties expressly
waived a trial by jury. At page 1063, the court held:
"If it [the court] may award actual damages, and
if, as the [statute] provides an award of exemplary
damages may be made in addition to an award for actual dan1ages, a court also has the power, when the
parties themselves waive a jury and ask the court to
try such issues, to award exemplary damages.''
All this case holds is that it is the waiver of the jury trial
by the parties which clothed the trial court with authority
to award exemplary damages.
9
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Pure Oil Co. v. Quarles, 183 Okla. 418, 82 P. 2d 970, is
an action at law for polution damages to a stream in which
the parties also waived a jury. At page 975, that court
holds:

"We may say here, that we are unable to ~ind
merit in the defendants' contention that only a JUry
may, under this statute, award exemplary damages;
that the court in a tort action where jury is waived is
unauthorized to do so. In such case, the court in all respects exercises the function of the jury, and its findings have the force and effect of a jury verdict. [ Citations] Although we held in ~Ed Continent Petroleum
Corp. v. Bettis, 180 Okla. 193, 69 P. 2d 346, that the
court in an equity case, tried without jury, may not
render judgment for exemplary damages, we there
recognized the power of the court to do so in tort actions where jury is waived.''
Pickwick Stages v. Board of Trustees of tlle City of
El Paso De Robles, 54 Cal. App. 730, 215 Pac. 558, is another exan1ple of an action at law for money damages only
which was tried to the court.

Not only do these cases fail to support the proposition
for which plaintiffs cite them, they manifestly support our
position (stated at pages 51-53, opening brief) to the effect
that a court in mandamus or equitable proceedings may not
award exemplary damages.
The plaintiff, moreover, at pages 63 and 64 of their
brief evidently contend that the trial court was entitled to.
disregard the verdict of the jury that no actual damages
were suffered as a result of plaintiffs' expulsions and to
award nominal damages. This amounts to an argument
that the court in fact granted the plaintiffs a judg1nent
10
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notwithstanding the verdict. The contrary is true, of
course, and the judge expressly denied plaintiffs' motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict at the same time
it denied their motion for a new trial.
\V e think the glaring weakness in plaintiffs' argument
that there is a right to recovery of exemplary damages in
the circumstances is found at page 65 of their brief. There,
the most that they can state is that in a proceeding such as
this, damages resembling exemplary damages, such as damages for mental suffering, humiliation, et cetera, are clearly recoverable. Damages" resembling" exemplary damages are still not exemplary damages any more than one identical twin, who resembles the other, is the other. We stress
the fact that they do not site a single case in which an expelled union member proceeding in mandamus or in equity
for reinstatement to union membership and damages has
been 1awarded exemplary damages. vV e know of no such
case either. Damages for mental suffering, humiliation,
etcetera, such as were allowed in the case of Nissen v. International Brotherhood, 229 Iowa 1028, 295 N. W. 858, 141
ALR 598, were compensatory in nature rather than exemplary. See 15 Am. J ur. 595, where the text reads:
''Damages for mental suffering are generally regarded as being actual or compensatory in character,
and not as vindictive or punitive * * *. ''
See also, 15 Am. J ur. 603, where it is said:
"l\fental suffering consisting in a sense of insult,
indignity, or humiliation or an injun~ to the feelings
which accompanies or follows a physical act injury or
which is caused by a wanton, intentional, or malicious
act is generally considered to be a proper element of
compensatory damages in an action brought to recov11
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er for such physical injury or such wanton, intention,
or malicious act.''
The plaintiffs contend at page 69 of their brief that the
case of Martin v. Curran, 303 N.Y. 276, 101 N.E. 2d 683,
which we cited at page 57 of our opening brief has been
overruled in the later New York decision of Madden v. Atkins, 4 N.Y. 2d 283, 151 N.E. 2d 73. We dispute this. We
call attention to the fact that Martin v. Curran, supra, was
cited in support of the proposition that a labor union should
not be held liable in exemplary damages for malicious acts
of some of its officers or members unless it can be shown
that such acts were known to and ratified or approved in
some manner by the labor organization, i.e. the membership as a whole. Martin v. Curran, supra, involved an action for libel, a cause of action in which malice is an essential ingredient. The Court of Appeals in Jiartin v. Curran
refused to hold the labor organization liable in damages
for the m1alicious publication because there was no showing
that the union membership as a whole approved or sanctioned the same.
The case of Madden v. Atkins, supra, on the other
hand, is simply an action for reinstatement to membership
and actual compensatory damages suffered as a re8ult of
a wrongful expulsion. The New York Court of ~lppeals in
Madden v. Atkins, supra, concluded that it \Yas not necessary in order to hold the labor organization liable for compensatory damages proximatel~T caused b~~ the wrongful
expulsion to prove that the membership as a whole approved or ratified the expulsion. The question of exemplary
damages was- never raised nor discussed by the court in
Jf add en v. Atkins, supra, and the case does not impair the
soundness of the .Zllartin r. Curran proposition that liability
12
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which is founded upon malicious conduct will not be imputed to a labor organization unless the malice was known to
and ratified by the membership as a whole.
At page 74 of plaintiffs' brief, they state: "The damages suffered by plaintiffs were great and extensive. Their
loss of earnings alone exceeded the amount of punitive
damages awarded. In addition, they suffered humiliation
by being branded as expelled members.'' These are the
very issues that were submitted to the jury, and plaintiffs
are simply disagreeing with the jury's verdict. The trial
court upheld the verdict of the jury and denied their motions for judgment n.o.v. and a new trial, and consequently,
these jury findings are res adjudicata.

ANSWER TO POINT VII
PLAINTIFFS' CROSS APPEAL
Under Point VII of their brief, plaintiffs make their
argument in support of the points raised on their cross appeal. The plaintiffs have apparently withdrawn one of
their grounds on cross appeal, namely; that the court erred
in denying their motion for judgment nothwithstanding the
verdict. (See Statement of Points on Cross Appeal, R. 692.)
It will not be necessary, therefore, to discuss that ground.
Earlier, counsel for the plaintiffs represented to this
court in a memorandum in support of their Motion for Reconsideration of Motion to Settle the Record that they did
not intend to rely on any of the transcript evidence in support of their cross appeal, but would limit themselves to
an argument that the court's factual determination and
its conclusions entitled them, as a matter of law, to a new

13
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trial. At page 6 of the memorandum mentioned above,
they stated:
"Insofar as [plaintiffs'] cross appeal is concerned, we intend to urge only that having found t~at the
jury's verdict was against the weight of the evidence,
the trial court committed reversible error in failing to
grant a new trial. No transcript of the evidence is necessary to sustain this position.''
A careful reading of plaintiffs' argument under Point
VII leads us to conclude that plaintiffs have, in fact~on
ored the represent,ation that they did not intend t~ at
all upon any evidence contained in the transcript of the
trial to the jury in support of the contention that the court
erred in denying their motion for a nmY trial. It would appear they have thus limited themselves to the court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment.
We must then appraise the arguments contained in
Poinf VII of their brief in the light of Utah law, under
which the granting or denying of a motion for new trial is
a matter that rests in the sound discretion of the trial
court. In Utah, the granting or denying of a motion for
new trial will not be disturbed upon review except in circumstances when the ~action of the trial court can be said
to constitute an abuse of discretion.
The plaintiffs, at pages 85 through 87 of their brief,
set out in full findings of fact Nos. 17 (a) through 17 (i)
contained in the order denying plaintiffs' motions for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial.
It is evidently on the strength of these findings that they
conclude that the court had the dnt~~ under the law to grant
their motion for a new trial, and that its refusal to do so
was error.

14
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This argument is not tenable. \rhat the plaintiffs have
done is quote some of the court's findings of fact, while
omitting others, so that the facts which they have recited in
their brief are, in effect, quoted out of context. Thus, the
plaintiffs have quite conveniently ignored finding of fact
No. 18, which follows i1nmediately after finding of fact
No. 17 ( i), wherein Judge Hoyt further found:
''That there was irreconcilable conflict in the testimony of witnesses as to the foregoing matters and
particularly as to whether the so-called referral system continued to be used by local union officers of the
respondent association. That there was much testimony on the part of witnesses on each side which the
court believes was false and evasive regarding this and
other matters above-mentioned. That respondent failed to call as witnesses the business agent of its Las
Vegas Local or its International Representative for
the Nevada area. That it appears reasonable to believe that these two union officers should have known
better than any other witnesses called by respondent
whether the referral system continued to be used in
the Las Vegas area and whether or not the petitioner
and intervenor were or were not denied work referrals.''
When finding· of fact No. 18 is considered in juxtaposition
with findings of fact Nos. 17 (a) through 17 (i), it becomes
evident that Judge Hoyt conceded that irreconcilable conflict existed as to every material issue in the case. He was
unable to resolve these conflicts and, moreover, he could
not even determine whether the witnesses called b~~ the
plaintiffs or those called by the defendant were testifying
truthfully. With the record in this state, it seems utterly
inconceivable to contend that the trial court's denial of
plaintiffs' motion for a new trial amounted to an abuse of
discretion.

15
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It is quite clear that for the plaintiffs to succeed under
Utah law on the ground that the evidence is insufficient
to justify the verdict, considerably more must be shown
than that the trial court, upon its view of the evidence, is
inclined to disagree with the verdict of the jury. Even
under general principels of law, such ,a disagreement or dissatisfaction with a jury's verdict should not induce the trial
court to grant a new trial. Thus, at 39 Am. Jur. 139, Section 129, the text states:

"*

* * Under a statute authorizing the granting of a
new trial where the verdict is not sust,ained by sufficient evidence, a new trial may be granted though the
evidence was sufficient to take the case to the jury. It
is not, however, a sufficient ground for a new trial
that the verdict is merely contrary to what appears to
be a preponderance of the testimony, or that the court,
acting as trier of the facts, would have arrived at a
conclusion opposed to that of the jury. It has been
said that the only question before the court is whether
the evidence was so overwhelmingly in favor of the defendant that a 'Terdict for the pl,aintiff can only be explained on the ground of prejudice, partiality, corruption, or mistake. * * * ''

The Utah cases are in accord with the proposition quoted
above.
In Valiotis v. Utah-Apex Jfining Co., 55 Utah 151, 184
Pac. 802, in determining -whether the trial court had properly exercised its discretion in denying a motion for a new
trial, this court held :
"This court has repeatedly held that the discretion of the trial court exercised in granting or refusing to grant a motion for a new trial based on the insufficiency of the ev~dence to justif~T _the verdict can-
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not be inh,rfered with when, upon examination of the
evidence as disclosed by the record, it is apparent that
there is a substantial conflict of evidence as to material issues of fact in the case relative to which the
insufficiency is alleged.''
In Vaiiotis, the ground relied upon was, "that the verdict
was against the weight of the evidence", and this court
clearly held that such was not a proper ground upon which
to base an order granting a new trial.
In Uptown Appliance & Radio Co. v. Flint, Utah, 29 P.
2d 826, this court stated at page 829:
"Jury trials are a part of the fundamental tenets
of our judicial system and where, as in this case a
litigant has fully, completely and without restraint
been permitted to show his full grievance to a jury
~and they have conscientiously and without any showing of prejudice or other extraneous influences decided the matter there must be some basic and compelling reason so inherent in the evidence that the trial
judge would be warranted in placing his judgment as
to the result to be reached over and above that of the
jury.
" 'A court, vacating a verdict and granting a new
trial by merely setting up his opinion or judgment
against that of the jury, but usurps judicial power and
prostitutes the constitutional trial by jury.' Jensen v.
Denver & Rio Grande Railroad Company, 44 Utah 100,
138 P. 1185, 1192.
"The result reached by the jury in this case seems
to be in ·accordance with the evidence produced.
''This being the state of the evidence we believe,
and so hold, that an order to retry this rna tter is not
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warranted and to that extent is an abuse of discretion
upon the part of the trial judge.''
In Holmes v. Nelson, Utah, 326 P. 2d 722 at page 726,
Justice Crockett, concurring, wrote:
''If the trial court is to fulfill his function of maintaining general supervision over litigation to see that
justice is done, it is necessary that he have the power
to set aside verdicts and grant new trials when the
objective is not served. But such prerogative should
be exercised with caution and forbearance consistent
with his important and imperative duty to safeguard
the right of trial by jury. The verdict, when supported by substantial evidence, should be regarded as presumptively correct and should not be interfered with
merely because the judge might disagree with the result. The prerogative should only be exercised when,
in the view of the trial court, it seems clear that the
·jury has misapplied or failed to take into account
proven facts ; or misunderstood or disregarded the
law; or made findings clearly against the weight of
evidence so that the verdict is offensive to his sense
of justice to the extent that he cannot in good conscience permit it to stand."
The Florida decision, Gulf Power Co. l'. Bagby, 113
Fla. 739, 152 So. 23, cited at page 88 of the plaintiffs' brief
is not good law in Utah, and it appears to be one of the
cases decided under the ''thirteenth juror'' concept, under
which theory the trial court acts as the final, or thirteenth,
juror and is placed under an affirmative dut~T to set aside
the verdict any time the verdict does not coincide ·with its
own analysis or apprais,al of the evidence. This concept,
as Justice Crockett pointed out in his concurring opinion
in Holmes v. Nelson, supra, has never prevailed in r tah.
In view of the law of Utah and the fact that the con18
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flicting evidence on the material issues was in the opinion
of the trial court irreconcilable, it is clear beyond peradventure that the denial of the plaintiffs' motion for a new
trial was a proper exercise of judicial discretion.
CONCLUSION
'Ve respectfully submit that the matters raised by
plaintiffs as an answer to the points discussed in our opening brief in support of our appeal lack merit, and that defendant union is entitled to a reversal of the judgment of
the court below on the issues of the alleged wrongful expulsion, exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and court
costs. The plaintiffs, moreover, have failed to show that
the trial court erred in denying their motion for a new trial
in connection with the damage issues tried before the jnr~r,
and, accordingly, their cross appeal should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
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